Legislative Speeches and Legislative Votes
Accurately estimating the policy preferences of individual legislators has long formed a key part of efforts to model intra-party politics. To date, the vast majority of work in this area has relied on inductive scaling of roll call votes, using either discriminant (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997) or Bayesian statistical methods (Clinton, Jackman and Rivers, 2004 ). Yet roll call votes in parliamentary systems suffer from a number of problems that prevent them from forming a reliable basis for estimating legislators' ideal points. In most settings a significant proportion of legislative votes are not recorded, often for strategic reasons, while the votes that are singled out for roll calls may also be politically motivated, both resulting in selection bias (VanDoren, 1990; Carrubba et al., 2006; Carrubba, Gabel and Hug, 2008; Hug, 2010) . Perhaps more significantly, voting in most parliamentary systems is tightly controlled through party discipline, meaning that legislators vote with their party possibly not because of their policy preferences, but rather in spite of them (Laver, Benoit and Garry, 2003; Proksch and Slapin, 2010) .
What legislators say, however, is relatively unconstrained by comparison, and a growing subfield devoted to estimating legislator preferences using text as data has made good use of this information (e.g. Slapin and Proksch, 2010; Monroe and Maeda, 2004; Laver and Benoit, 2002) . Party leaders, it is believed, are less likely to punish legislators based on what they may say in a debate on a controversial bill, as long as they vote with the party line. This conventional wisdom regarding the less party strategic nature of legislative speech, however, has not gone unquestioned. Legislative speeches may also be prone to selection effects, as demonstrated by Proksch and Slapin (2012) who found that in the parliaments of the United Kingdom and Germany, the stronger the institutional incentives (electoral system, regime type, candidate selection) for party leaders to protect the party label, the less likely legislative speeches are to reflect true party cohesion since party leaders prevent potentially dissident backbenchers from taking the floor. This suggests that speeches may also underestimate the ideological differences within parties, especially if the electoral system is party-centered, but this effect has yet to be explored in other contexts or in direct comparison with voting. This paper directly compares the political positions estimated through roll call votes to those estimated through legislative speeches, using the example of an energy policy debate from the Swiss legislature in 2002-2003. Switzerland's parliament forms an ideal case for comparing votes to speeches because all legislative speeches as well as complete sets of all votes taken during each floor debate are recorded. 1 Since multiple votes are taken during the debate and passage of most bills, this provides multiple opportunities to observe votes during the debate over a single piece of legislation. In the energy debate we have selected, for instance, there were 66 different legislative votes, in addition to 30 separate speakers. To compare the measurement of policy preferences using votes versus speeches, we use different combinations of scaling procedures for roll call votes and speeches, e.g. one-dimensional IRT-based scaling on the roll call votes (using a logit-based likelihood) and a similar one-dimensional IRT-based scaling procedure on the speeches (using a Poisson-based likelihood). To investigate whether the selection of speakers is systematically related to political variables, we also test a model of speaker selection. Moreover, we test a model to predict text scaling positions using the nuclear policy preferences in legislators' electoral districts, extracted from two federal nuclear policy referenda in Switzerland in 2003.
Our analysis confirms the widely held view that compared to the disciplined party voting that takes place in most parliamentary systems, the positions expressed in legislative speeches reveal larger heterogeneity in intra-party preferences. Spoken positions display a considerably larger range of preferences than those expressed through voting, particularly within parties with highly unified voting behavior. Furthermore, these divergences in observed behaviorvotes versus speeches-vary systematically according to constituency-level electoral preferences. Legislators tend to vote with their parties but speak to their constituents.
Data: Swiss Nuclear Legislation 2002-2003
Our comparison of policy measures constructed from votes and speeches comes from a key debate that occurred in the Swiss legislature of the future of its nuclear policy. Following the 1986 nuclear disaster at Chernobyl, the Swiss voters had approved a 10-year moratorium on new nuclear plants, but in the same vote rejected a full-scale nuclear phaseout. After the expiration of the moratorium, the debates in 2002-2003 revisited the nuclear phaseout question, focusing as well on national energy policy with respect to alternative forms of renewable energy. This followed a period during which many European countries debated a nuclear phaseout, with Germany for instance deciding to phase out its nuclear reactors in 2000. In Switzerland, these decisions were made through parliamentary decision followed by referendums.
The Swiss Legislative Context
Switzerland's legislative institutions meet three important conditions for the analysis of the differences between scaling results based on roll call votes and those based on texts. First, during most legislative debates, many votes are taken and all votes are recorded as roll calls, providing a large amount of voting data to estimate the positions of individual legislators. In the energy debate that we examine, we draw on 66 different roll call votes taken during the debate and passage of a major energy reform bill.
Second, the protracted debate also leaves a rich record of statements and speeches made by individual legislators, with every major party clearly setting out its position on the bill in the debates. Our analysis is based on 30 MPs from 6 parties, with an average speech length per MP of 2,580 words. 2 Finally, the Swiss legislature is characterized by relatively weak party control over who speaks and what may be said. Swiss parliamentary rules and procedures provide for relatively strong individual and minority rights for MPs (Damgaard, 1995; Döring, 1995; Schwarz, Bächtiger and Lutz, 2011) as well as flat internal hierarchies. Formal and informal agendasetting powers of the parliamentary elite (party leaders, most senior MPs like committee chairs, parliamentary presidents), which would lead to 'incomplete' records of floor debates because of the control of legislative procedures by partisan actors (Proksch and Slapin, 2012) , are in many ways curbed in the Swiss case. The rules of procedure in the Swiss parliament empower each MP to file petitions (amendments) 3 to any lawmaking proposal, leaving few mechanisms for party leaders to stifle or punish MPs who speak freely in a debate. 4 Furthermore, each petition ensures the submitting MP the right to present and defend it during the floor debate, and there is a vote on every petition. Every lawmaking project is therefore accompanied by detailed debates about disputed aspects with separate votes taken on each of these aspects, in addition to the compulsory votes on the entire lawmaking project (such as the final passage).
Rules and Procedures During Debates
Government bills undergo extensive debate in committees before reaching the floor. Committee decisions, however, do not bar opposing party groups or MPs from later filing petitions to re-write specific parts of the bill (see also Schwarz, Bächtiger and Lutz, 2011) . The usual procedure is as follows. First, committee majority speakers (rapporteurs) present a general introduction to the matter. Second, party group speakers 5 communicate the official party position to the proposed bill. Third, the government lays down its position. Next, a vote is taken as to whether the chamber shall refuse the bill from the outset or enter a detailed debate (article-byarticle). If they decide to enter the debate, all disputed parts of the bill (where petitions have been filed in the run-up to the floor debate) are separately discussed with opinions given by the originator(s) of the petition, the committee rapporteur(s), party group speakers, and the government. Having discussed and voted on all petitions, the chamber then takes an overall vote on the wording of the entire bill and refers it to the second chamber where the whole process starts anew. After resolving any disagreements on the wording of the bill (through the navette procedure), each chamber takes a final passage vote.
The rules of the Swiss National Council limit each MP's speaking time. There are six debate categories ranging from 'free debate' to 'written procedure.' 6 The energy policy debate The rules of procedure also determine who is entitled to speak. Compared to conventional parliamentary systems, the role of party leaders in controlling the selection of speakers is relatively weak. The role of the party group speaker is usually assigned to MPs who are members of the related committee (but committee members are not party speakers by default). Moreover, as any MP is entitled to file any petition to re-write specific sections of a lawmaking proposal, which then allows her to present and defend it on the floor, party leader control over who speaks is limited to informal methods (e.g. internal appeals to preserve the party brand and apply selfconstraint, or exerting peer pressure See Cox and McCubbins (1993); Owens (2006) ). 8 We explore the question of systematic selection of speakers below, but first we briefly describe the main features of the energy policy debate and outline our data analysis procedure to measure policy preferences of Swiss legislators from both the votes and speeches.
The Energy Policy Debate of 2002-2003
Our the initiatives paved the way for the rather nuclear-friendly federal act to come into force. 9 The official title of the acts were 'Moratorium plus' and 'Power without Nuclear' and Federal Act on Nuclear Energy (official bill no. 01.022; for details, see http://www.parlament.ch/d/suche/seiten/geschaefte. aspx?gesch_id=20010022.
10 A formidable summary (in German and French) of the debate can be found under http://www.parlament. ch/d/suche/seiten/legislaturrueckblick.aspx?rb_id=20010022. The full verbatim transcripts of the entire debate in the National Council starts under http://www.parlament.ch/ab/frameset/d/n/4614/62109/ d_n_4614_62109_62110.htm?DisplayTextOid=62111.
11 The type of the votes varies from those in which the project in its entirety is at stake (i.e., vote on entry into detailed deliberation at the beginning of the debate, overall vote on the bill after first reading, and final passage vote after agreement between the two chambers is reached) to those on detailed aspects (MP petitions).
In the speeches made during the various stages of the debate, all political parties were represented. Our analysis is based on 275 speeches made by 30 legislators (median length 2,000 words, mean 2,580 words).
Measuring Legislator Positions from Roll Call Votes
We begin by scaling the one-dimensional positions of MPs in the energy debate using IRT-based roll call vote analysis. We selected the 66 votes held during the energy legislation, as well as the entire set of 3,194 votes from the 46th legislative period as a baseline. In the one-dimensional representation of ideal points 12 the line-up of all parties represents their expected order and is quite similar to the full picture of the 46th legislative period, as depicted in Figure 1 . 13 In both models, the Social Democrats (red) and the Greens form the left (i.e., environmentalist, antinuclear) position, the Christian-democrats (orange) occupy the center while the FDP-Liberals The results of the two IRT models are highly correlated (Pearson's r = .95). The model for the single debate differs in two respects compared to the entire legislature, however: we find considerably smaller intra-party variation among the left and a more blended picture among the parties to the right. These differences reflect the fact that party unity is above average on energy-related votes in the (already highly united) left camp while it is below average for CVP, FDP-Liberals and SVP (Schwarz, 2009) . While the attitude of all MPs in both left parties is firmly anti-nuclear, there are well-known outliers in all political directions (nuclear hardliners and MPs with moderately anti-nuclear positions) within the bourgeois parties.
12 For ideal-point estimation we ran a one-dimensional item response theory model using MCMCpack in R, with parameters burnin=50,000, mcmc=1,000,000, thin=1,000. 13 Here we have estimated the divide in one dimension. Expert surveys, party manifesto research and roll call analysis unequivocally characterize Swiss politics as predominantly uni-dimensional on a classical left-right axis (Benoit and Laver, 2006; Hug and Schulz, 2007) . We also fitted the two-dimensional IRT model to the energy debate, but the ranking order did not substantially differ from the first dimension. It thus seems safe to conclude that, from an RCV perspective, the selected energy debate is predominantly uni-dimensional and given the almost perfect correlation between the two IRT models shown above, the dimension found in the energy debate can be roughly labeled as left-right. This is important because the comparison of roll call estimates and text scaling estimates in section 5 is carried out on a one-dimensional basis (due to dimensional limitations in text scaling methods). All in all, the distribution of the RCV ideal point estimates and the agreement rates point to the relatively low capabilities among center-right parties to enforce party discipline (weakly restricted voting behavior) while party unity among the Social-democrats and the Greens is very high.
Measuring Legislator Positions from Speeches

What Determines Who Speaks?
Roll call vote analysis to estimate ideal points is often criticized because the selection of observable votes is politically determined, thereby producing downward-biased estimates of intraparty heterogeneity (Carrubba et al., 2006) . Recent research has centered on a similar discussion with regard to selection effects in parliamentary speeches, suggesting that bias in speaker selection as well as the content of speeches varies with the institutional context (Proksch and Slapin, 2012) . Proksch and Slapin (2012) 's argument is based on a well-established view that parliamentary rules and legislative behavior are endogenous to electoral competition (e.g. Carey, 2007; Hix, 2004; Mayhew, 1974) . Thus, in political systems that foster an individual 14 The agreement rate is calculated as follows: If an MP agrees with the majority of his or her party, the assigned value per vote is +1, if she disagrees it is 0, if she abstains the assigned value is 0.5. The box plots show the average MP agreement per party. relationship between MPs and their voters, party leaders are more likely to accept speeches that deviate from the party line. By contrast, in contexts where these relations are mediated by the party, and party unity matters, the party leadership is likely to prohibit expression of dissent on the parliamentary floor. Proksch and Slapin (2012) argue that due to these constraints, the scaling of speeches in these political contexts encounters problems that are similar to those found in the analysis of roll call votes.
The rules in the Swiss parliament are only minimally restrictive, reflecting the strong component of 'individual accountability' (Carey, 2009) in the Swiss political system (Traber, Hug and Sciarini, 2014) . Compared to other parliamentary systems with a proportional representation electoral system, party leaders in the Swiss parliament have little formal means to control their backbenchers. If an MP is unhappy with her party's majority position and would like to make her disagreement public, she can file a personal petition to change the unwanted part of the proposed bill, and she will be granted five minutes to defend her view on the floor. We thus argue that contrary to other parliaments, not only is the selection of speakers in the Swiss parliament less biased, but also that the speakers are less constrained in their statements if they diverge from the party line.
We estimated two types of models to detect possible selection bias in legislative speeches.
The results are shown in Table 2 . The first model is a logistic regression model that tests whether certain MPs have higher probability to speak based on a number of individual characteristics, such as language, role within the party and policy position (ideal points). Besides the general policy position, measured on the basis of all votes in one legislative period 15 , we included the distance between the MPs' ideal points in the energy debate and the party's policy median in this debate. The model also takes account of constituency preferences on the energy debate, represented by the average share of Yes votes in the popular vote on the nuclear moratorium referendum from May 2003. We model a quadratic relationship, because MPs from cantons where the share of yes votes was especially high or especially low might be more likely to speak than MPs from cantons where the population was more polarized. 16
15 Ideological position is measured by ideal point estimates calculated on the basis of the entire 46th legislative period (see section 3). 16 We thank an anonymous reviewer for referring to this point. The second, linear, model includes the same variables to test whether the length of an MP's speech is determined by these characteristics. The most important result in Table 2 is that committee members appear to speak more often and much longer than their fellow MPs. Apart from committee membership, however, none of the other MP attributes consistently determines legislative speech. Apparently, leftist MPs are more likely to speak than MPs on the right side of the policy spectrum in this debate, but we find no evidence that party leaders and party group leaders speak systematically more often than backbenchers. 17 What is more, there seems to be no restrictions for MPs with positions that are distant from the party's policy median.
In sum, Swiss MPs participate in debates according to their interests and without significant institutional constraints, and not in a way relating to a specific role within the party. We therefore do not expect our measures to be affected by selection bias from the censorship of speakers by party leaders based on the positions they might have expressed, as measured by whether or how long they speak.
Text Scaling Estimates
To scale MP positions using their speeches, we fit the Poisson scaling model of Slapin and Proksch (2008) , which estimates the position θ i of each text i on a single latent dimension.
This model has been applied to parliamentary speeches to estimate MP positions in other parliaments, such as pro-and anti-EU positioning in the European Parliament and to preferences for austerity in Irish budget speeches (Benoit and Lowe, 2013) . The advantage of the Poisson scaling method is that as an unsupervised method, it requires no "training" step or identification of known positions. Furthermore, its method closely matches that of the one-dimensional IRT model, and can be viewed itself as a one-dimensional IRT model for count data (Lowe, 2008) . 18 The Poisson scaling results for the energy debate are shown in Figure 3 . The plot shows party groupings that are quite similar to those in the previous roll call analysis in section 3, 17 In fact, party group leaders are excluded from the models because they did not participate at all in the debate. Also not included in the models as separate independent variable is whether an MP has filed a petition since all petitioners are granted access to the floor and thus speak. 18 Our estimation method differs from the RCV scaling only in that we use a maximimum likelihood method, from the R package austin. The text estimates are based on texts aggregated by MP, with pre-processing and text selection performed as we have described in the Appendix. There are also significant intra-party differences, but in contrast to previous roll call analysis they do not only occur within the center and center-right parties, but also within the parties on the left. This hints at intra-party differences in preferences which are not revealed in roll call votes.
Comparing Vote Scaling to Text Scaling
Our expectation is that the political censorship affecting roll call votes -a well known result attributed to both party discipline in parliamentary voting and RCV selection bias (Carrubba et al., 2006 )-will make the scaled positions from roll call votes significantly less heterogenous than corresponding estimates from text scaling. What ultimately matters is how legislators vote, rather than what they say, and party leaders may consider it within each legislator's perogative to speak against a party's official position, as long as they support it with their votes. (as is to be expected according to the results in section 3) but heterogeneity along the y-axis.
This suggests that where party discipline is relatively low and thus MPs relatively unconstrained in their voting behavior roll call analysis and text analysis produce quite similar results. Where party unity is strong and voting behavior constrained, as within the SP and GPS 20 , text analysis picks up differences which are not detected through votes.
However, the intra-party differences revealed through text analysis do not constitute a major 
Explaining Text Scaling Positions
The energy debate linked together a new federal act and two anti-nuclear popular initiatives.
The results of these referendums provide valuable information about voter preferences, both in general and on the level of MPs' electoral districts (cantons).
Both popular initiatives against nuclear energy -the initiative for nuclear phaseout and the initiative for a 10-year ban on new nuclear plants -were rejected by the Swiss voters on May 18, 2003. However, from a regional perspective the rejection was not unequivocal: the city canton of Basel-Stadt embraced both initiatives by a substantial margin, and in surrounding BaselLandschaft the moratorium initiative also received a majority. Moreover, there was substantial variation in the results between cantons. Figure 5 plots the variation by canton in support for both referendum measures. In the case of the phaseout initiative, for example, the share of support varied from 23% in the distinctive pro-nuclear canton of Aargau 21 and 52% in the most skeptical canton of Basel-Stadt.
The regional variation followed two main patterns.is not accidental. A second pattern combines personal concerns and financial federalism. People living in the wider area around the five nuclear plants share more or less the same risks, but for those living in the cantons where the nuclear plants are located the risks are somewhat outweighed by corporate tax revenues of the power plant operators and the income tax revenues of the highly qualified staff working in these sites. 22 Furthermore, the personal concern aspect extends to two French nuclear sites close to the Swiss border. The Fessenheim plant is most proximate to the cantons of Basel-Stadt, Basel-Landschaft and Jura (but also to nuclear-friendly canton of 21 The canton of Aargau hosts 3 of Switzerland's 5 nuclear reactors, the country's interim storage facility for spent fuel elements, and the Paul Scherrer Institute (the energy research department of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology ETH).
22 One could even push this argument to the municipal level because Swiss tax competition also plays between municipalities within each canton which means that the best tax deal by far -apart from the direct view on a cooling tower in some sites -gets the municipality where the nuclear plant is located. In this paper we do not follow further this path but stay at cantonal level. Aargau), and until the mid-1990s there were seven French nuclear reactors near Geneva. 23 Thus our theoretical expectation is that the signals MPs send in their speeches to their constituents follow the variation in regional concern (both in terms of health risks and unequal share of economic benefits): MPs from nuclear-friendly cantons and those from nuclear-skeptical cantons adapt their speeches accordingly (even if sometimes in a very subtle way).
Moreover, the post-referendum survey among voters (the so-called VOX analysis, see Blaser et al., 2003) with regard to the two energy-related popular initiatives found significant effects of a voter's age (younger voters) and sex (females) on approval of the two initiatives (apart from obvious variables like political affiliations, e.g. left-wing voters who sympathized with GPS or SP were heavily in favor of the initiatives).
Consequently we tested the explanatory power of the constituency preference measure (share of approval in the anti-nuclear referenda) for the text analysis results with a couple of linear regression models. Additional independent variables were: roll call vote estimates for the energy debate, party fixed effects (reference category is centrist CVP), MPs' age and sex. Table 3 contains two reduced models (without constituency measures) and two full models including the district-level measures (approval rates in phaseout and moratorium referenda).
The results confirm the theoretical expectations: in every model the effect of district preference on the text scalings is significant at .05 level or better. 24 The higher the support for the initiatives, the more to the left is the MP position in the text scaling. This is strong evidence that individual MPs were speaking to their constituencies, yet voting with their party. Even when controlling for party effects, legislators from constituencies more (or less) supportive of the phaseout and the moratorium adapted their speeches accordingly, regardless of their party's majority position that guided the legislator's vote. 25 Not only are preferences measured from legislative speech more heterogeneous than preferences measured from votes, but also this variation is neither random nor based on methodological artifacts (binary roll calls on the one hand and large word frequency tables on the other). Our analysis found that the vote shares at the district level in an energy policy referendum closely linked with the investigated energy debate are significantly related to how legislators spoke about the proposed bill during the parliamentary debates. The higher the anti-nuclear vote in the electoral constituency, the more anti-nuclear are the positions as measured by text scalings.
This result reinforces our explanation of the observed differences found between roll call and text analysis, demonstrating that these differences may be explained by different levels of incentives on individual legislators who must balance party versus constituency concerns. MPs tended to adapt their speeches to constituencies, even when voting with their party's official position on the bill.
We have established that speech is more varied and less amenable to disciplinary actions by party leaders than votes, which tend largely on party lines even in less strongly whipped systems such as Switzerland. We have also shown that speeches made in parliament tend to be aimed at constituents based on political preferences specific to an MP's electoral district.
The question remains whether these findings are generalizable to other countries. In this regard two restrictions apply. First, our results are based on an in-depth study of a single debate.
The selected energy policy debate still constitutes an important and very contentious piece of legislation in Switzerland. Results are expected to be different if less prominent or noncontroversial examples are investigated. Second, whether the results are generalizable to other countries depends on the specific institutional setting, particularly regarding the degree of party discipline in votes and party control over speeches. We expect similar results in countries with weak party control over speeches and (relatively) high party discipline in roll calls.
Future research should focus on the difference between legislative voting and expressed positions through speech in systems with greater party discipline, or where speakers themselves may be censored as an extension of party discipline. Our analysis here however is a promising indication that the political speeches of MPs target a different audience than their votes, and that richer information about intra-party policy preferences can be found in the words that legislators use than in the votes they cast.
